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Many municipalities in the United States, especially in rapidly growing areas, are considering or have adopted impact
fee systems to help pay for the costs of new growth. Although such systems are a logical response to development pres-
sures and the need for providing capital facilities, they may violate well-established planning law traditions. This timely
article explores whether impact fee programs conflict with principles of planning and the due process of law, both of
which have been integral to the development of modem planning law.
Introduction
Raising expansion capital by setting connection charges
not exceeding a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated
costs of expansion, is permissible where expansion is
reasonably required, if use of the money raised is
limited to meeting the costs of expansion. Users "who
benefit especially, not from the maintenance of the
system, but by the extension of the system . . . should
bear the cost of that extension." 1
The concept of development exactions2 for off-site capi-
tal facilities, that is, that new growth and development
should pay a fair share of the cost of facilities needed to
serve that growth has, in just a few years, evolved from
an abstract theory3 into a full-blown land use "fad."4 In
Florida, for example, where land use "fads" find fertile
ground, 5 local authorities have been in a virtual fever to
enact and enforce ordinances imposing impact fees for
roads, parks, potable water, libraries, sanitary sewers,
solid waste, police, fire, and emergency services. 6 More
than forty local governments have enacted similar ordi-
nances during the last two years. 7 In such diverse areas
as San Francisco, Boston, and Aspen, developers pay a
fee or provide for affordable housing. 8 Exactions are, in
fact, a logical and reasonable response to the cost of
sprawl. 9 Exactions are not, however, free of drawbacks.
Their seductive attractiveness in terms of efficiency and
expediency should not be allowed to overshadow what
may be very serious conflicts with well-established plan-
ning law traditions. This article briefly discusses two
aspects of those traditions and suggests several ways in
which they conflict with exactions.
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Contemporary land use law, albeit subject to much crit-
icism, 10 is a reasonably balanced product of careful and
effective evolution. 11 The rigidity of Euclidean districts
has given way to process-secure flexible zoning districts.
Generally, a fair balance has been established between
public needs and private expectations. 12 The evolution of
land use controls and the establishment of a reasonable
balance between public and private interests is the result
of two important influences — planning13 and due process
of law. 14 Because exactions may conflict with the prin-
ciples of planning and may run counter to well-established
principles of due process, a genuine basis for concern
exists.
Planning
"If American land use controls are to work effectively and
fairly, they must be based upon (a) an overall understand-
ing of the needs for land in the community, and (b) a sense
of direction — that is to say, upon planning". 15 Simply put,
the reasonableness of land use controls depends upon
planning for coherence, comprehensiveness, and consis-
tency. 16 Otherwise, land use controls are nothing more
than ad hoc exercises of public authority over private
rights in a chaotic and often abusive process.
Unfortunately, planning, although influential in the
evolution of contemporary land use controls, has not lived
up to its theoretical promise. Indeed, many observers con-
clude that planning has been anything but successful. 17
Nevertheless, the overriding logic of planning as a basis
for land use controls has been a powerful influence in the
evolution of land use controls. In fact, Professor Haar's
insightful article, In Accordance with a Comprehensive
Plan, ls served as a powerful force in molding the efforts
of contemporary reformers like Babcock 19 and Sullivan, 20
despite the failure of the American Law Institute's Model
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Land Development Code to mandate planning as a prereq-
uisite for zoning. 21 Haar said:
It is difficult to see why zoning should not be required,
legislatively and judicially, to justify itself by conso-
nance with a master plan as well. It might even be
argued that any zoning done before a formal master
plan has been considered and promulgated is per se
unreasonable, because of failure to consider as a whole
the complex relationships between the various controls
which a municipality may seek to exercise over its in-
habitants in furtherance of the general welfare. 22
Although no one would claim that a clear judicial mandate
for planning has been established, even a brief review of
the Supreme Court's recent forays into the land use arena
illustrates that planning is now a well-accepted element
of a valid system of land use controls. In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York," the Court re-
jected an attack on New York City's landmark preserva-
tion law in part because "[i]n contrast to discriminatory
zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as part
of some comprehensive plan, the New York City law em-
bodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of
historic or aesthetic interest . . . ."24
Similarly, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc, 25
Justice Stevens noted that "the city's interest in planning
and regulating the use of property"26 is a substantial public
interest. More importantly, in Metromedia, Inc v. City
of San Diego, 27 Justice Brennan, a central figure in the
Court's decisions regarding zoning law, 28 criticized San
Diego's sign regulations because:
[Bjefore deferring to a city's judgment, a court must
be convinced that the city is seriously and comprehen-
sively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its
environment. Here, San Diego has failed to demonstrate
a comprehensive coordinated effort in its commercial
and industrial areas to address other obvious contribu-
tors to an unattractive environment
.
. . Of course, this
is not to say that the city must address all aesthetic
problems at the same time, or none at all. Indeed, from
a planning point of view, attacking the problem incre-
mentally and sequentially may represent the most sen-
sible solution. On the other hand, if billboards alone
are banned and no further steps are contemplated or
likely, the commitment of the city to improving its
physical environment is placed in doubt. By showing
a comprehensive commitment to making its physical
environment in commercial and industrial areas more
attractive, and by allowing only narrowly tailored ex-
ceptions, if any, San Diego could demonstrate that its
interest in creating an aesthetically pleasing environ-
ment is genuine and substantial. 29
Due Process of Law
The other fundamental influence on contemporary
planning law with which exactions may well conflict is
due process of law — a group of rights derived from the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. 30
Reduced to simple terms, due process of law is a limita-
tion on the manner in which government exercises power
over individual rights and interests. As Justice Fortas once
noted: "Due process of law is the primary and indispensable
foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and
essential term in the social compact which defines the
rights of the individual and delimits the powers which
the state may exercise."31
Notwithstanding the accepted fundamental nature of
due process, the precise meaning of the concept is undefined
and has been the subject of "[m]any controversies."32 " 'Due
process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are
undefinable, and its content varies according to specific
factual context . . . [ A]s a generalization, it can be said that
due process embodies differing rules of fair play, which
through the years, have become associated with differing
types of proceedings."33
Due process requires that governmental powers affecting
private rights and interests be exercised in a fundamentally
fair fashion. " 'Due process' emphasizes fairness between
the State and the individual dealing with the State. . . "34
Paying for amenities.
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This concept of fundamental fairness has shaped modern
land use controls both substantively35 and procedurally.
The substantive nature of due process of law in relation
to restrictions on land use was discussed by the Supreme
Court in Nectow v. City of Cambridge. 36 The Court
stated:
[T]he governmental power to interfere by zoning regu-
lations with the general rights of the land owner by
restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited,
and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 37
This standard has, for fifty years, provided the substantive
contours of land use controls. These contours have devel-
oped coincident with the clearly understood idea that the
public welfare is not limited to protection from offensive
and noxious activities and, therefore, the police power
itself is broad enough to respond to the needs of a develop-
ing nation. 38
Substantive due process is alive and well in the planning
law context and provides clear jurisprudential support for
Haar's planning thesis. 39 Haar believes that land use regu-
lations should be enacted pursuant to a comprehensive
plan because such regulations will bear a substantial rela-
tionship to the public health. 40 In other words, comprehen-
sive planning ensures existence of a substantial relationship
between the particular character, location or intensity of a
land use and the public health, safety, and welfare.
The policy behind the due process clause is protection
of rights through procedures that are fair. What is fair
depends upon a host of factors, particularly the private
rights involved. "Experience teaches. . that the affording
of procedural safeguards, which by their nature serve to
illuminate the underlying facts, in itself often operates to
prevent erroneous decisions on the merits from occurring."41
Notice to an individual of an impending decision that
affects him, the information upon which the decision is
to be made, and the opportunity to present opposing in-
formation and argument are examples of the kind of safe-
guards that ensure fundamental fairness. 'The assumption
is that by giving parties with sufficient interest in the out-
come a chance to present evidence from their point of
view, the government can best make an informed decision
which considers all relevant factors."42
As the above illustrates, fundamental fairness encom-
passes a number of concepts. The first of these concepts
is the notion that governmental decisions should be made
on the basis of merit, not on the basis of personalities or
self-interest: "The public has the right to expect its offi-
cers. . to make adjudications on the basis of merit. The
first step toward insuring that these expectations are real-
ized is to require adherence to the standards of due pro-
cess; absolute and uncontrolled discretion invites abuse."43
There must also be an adequate opportunity for affected
persons to find out what information will be used in the
decision-making process and to offer information or argu-
ment in rebuttal.
The mere existence of procedural safeguards is not
enough to satisfy the requirements of due process. "A fun-
damental requirement of due process is 'the opportunity
to be heard.' It is an opportunity which must be granted
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."44 A
meaningful opportunity to be heard also requires a
realistic opportunity to participate, free of practical con-
straints that prevent actual participation. 45
Due process also contemplates equal access and treat-
ment. It "is secured when the laws operate on all alike,
and no one is subjected to partial or arbitrary exercise of
the powers of government."46 This concept includes access
to processes without regard to economic station. As Justice
Black stated in Griffin v. Illinois, "[sjurely no one would
contend that either a state or the Federal Government
could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to
pay court costs in advance should be denied the right to
plead not guilty or to defend themselves in court."47 In
addition, he noted that "there can be no equal justice
where the kind of a trial a man gets depends upon the
amount of money he has."48
Another doctrine that is rooted in the due process clause
is the doctrine of vagueness — the constitutional require-
ment that a government proscription be explicit enough
that affected persons are on notice of those acts or omis-
sions that will expose them to liability. 49 In the absence
of defined standards that are uniformly applied there can
be no equal treatment except by mere coincidence.
Governmental power must be confined to the principles
of due process if the salutory goals of the constitutional
draftsmen are to be achieved.
The difficulty with exactions is that they are antithetical
to the planning and due process principles stated above
in a number of ways. They are inherently inconsistent
with the established tenets that have defined planning and
due process in the past.
First, exactions conflict with planning and due process
principles because the idea of a fair share "pay as you go"
exaction system creates the illusion that the character,
location, and magnitude of land use is simply a matter
of a developer's willingness to pay for the cost of new ser-
vices required by new growth. Indeed, developers are
often vocal supporters of reasonable exactions because
they see them as a means of overcoming local concern
about growth. Given that most growth management con-
trols have been predicated on the capacity of available public
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facilities, 50 the developers' perspective is understandable.
The trouble is that the appropriateness of a particular land
use at a particular location depends on far more than the
developer's willingness to pay for needed infrastructure.
The intangible values, community character and quality
of life, which lie at the heart of Justice Douglas' now often-
repeated ode to community character in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 51 are vulnerable to incompatible or unde-
sirable land uses whether or not a developer is willing to
pay for water, sewer, or roads. In other words, quality
of life involves far more than fiscal efficiency. It is impera-
tive that land use controls be capable of conserving com-
munity values even if a developer is willing to pay for
the cost of needed improvements. Of course, imposition
of an exaction system does not mandate abandonment
of planning programs directed toward maintaining the
community character and quality of life. Nevertheless,
some legislators appear to accept that adoption of an exac-
tion scheme results in abandonment of this type of pro-
gram. For example, the Florida Legislature52 has taken the
view that change is inevitable and that the focus must
be on how to accommodate that change. This position
has upset dozens of local authorities that have comprehen-
sive plans designed to protect important community
values even though greater densities, higher buildings, or
more coverage could be accommodated financially.
The antiplanning implications of exactions go beyond
the political impacts just described. The reason is that
quality of life and community character are concepts that
are difficult to quantify and therefore difficult to reduce
to simple regulatory equations, particularly in communities
that are not large enough to support a sophisticated plan-
ning department. The inevitable temptation is simply to
abandon the intangibles and to devote available energies
to capital facilities planning— a reactive rather than a pro-
active approach to the future.
As troubling as the antiplanning aspect of exactions are,
the whole idea that permission to develop should be de-
pendent on one's willingness to pay raises an even more
odious implication that was rejected long ago as inappro-
priate — that zoning is or should be for sale. Most exaction
ordinances contain a schedule of payments purportedly
linked to the community needs occasioned by new growth
and development. Most ordinances, however, also provide
for an alternative fee calculation that responds to the im-
precision of impact assessments. As will be shown below,
this type of provision is unfortunate because the calculation
is arrived at through negotiation, another contemporary
land use "fad."
In plain terms, under this type of provision, the devel-
oper bargains for his zoning. He may agree to give the
community a new road, ambulance, or whatever, if per-
mitted to build at a higher density. Such a process ignores
the merits of a particular land use at a particular location
and focuses instead on the payment to be received. In
other words, a six-lane road may solve the traffic needs
of new growth and development, but it does so at a cost.
Growth for its own sake cannot justify transforming
neighborhoods, wetlands, parks, and waterfronts into
freeways. Worst of all, the deal made usually depends on
who the deal maker is, rather than what is proposed. This
negotiatory process, which is increasingly being used to
arrive at decisions relating to land use, 53 exacerbates the
risk inherent in exactions. The reason is that negotiations
are uncomprehensive and not standard- or process-oriented;
they rely not on well-conceived policies but on ad hoc
agreements that are usually private. The finely tuned ten-
sion between public and private interest, tempered by
citizen involvement and participation, threatens to be
replaced by negotiated deals, the fairness of which
depends on the integrity of individuals in office at any
given time.
After years of faithful adherence to the principles of fun-
damental fairness, it is difficult to understand why this
nation would suddenly find salvation in an idea that has
the potential for abuse and disparate treatment. Of course,
the obvious solution is to eliminate the alternative fee
calculation process from exaction ordinances, which would
eliminate the possibility of abuse and manipulation. The
trouble is that the so-called science of exactions is so im-
perfect that (understandably) few authorities feel comfort-
able relying exclusively upon a rigid preset schedule,
which represents a strong condemnation of the entire con-
cept of exactions. In the abstract, these concerns are
manageable. The limited scrutiny applied to local regula-
tions by courts, however, makes it difficult to believe that
the abuses described will not flourish and heighten con-
cern about the concept of exactions.
Once it is accepted that it is appropriate for a landowner
to pay an exaction in order to exercise his constitutional
property rights, judicial review of exaction standards is
limited to a "fairly debatable" standard54 — what Judge
Goldberg of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
fondly refers to as the "anything goes" test. 55 Simply stated,
a regulatory standard has to be outlandish before a court
will intervene, a notion that has assuredly been confirmed
by the Supreme Court's modern polestar of local economic
regulations, New Orleans v. Dukes. 56
Dukes was in fact an equal protection case, but the
scope of judicial scrutiny implicit in the fairly debatable
standard and the rational basis standard are virtually iden-
tical. The city of New Orleans had passed an ordinance pro-
hibiting street vendors in the Vieux Carre. The city,
solicitous of the interests of existing vendors (one vendor
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Impact fees—where does the road lead?
in particular, reportedly a politically influential individ-
ual), exempted those vendors who had been active in
street vending for more than six years. 57 A hot dog vendor
with less than six years in the streets brought suit challeng-
ing the ordinance. The Fifth Circuit invalidated the ordi-
nance on the ground that it was ludicrous to suggest that
six years of experience selling hot dogs was distinguishable
from five years on the job. The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that judicial scrutiny of esentially
economic regulations is limited, and that courts should
not second-guess the judgment of elected officials:
States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of
their local economies under their police powers, and
rational distinctions may be made with substantially
less than mathematical exactitude. Legislatures may im-
plement their program step by step ... in such economic
areas, adopting regulations that only partially amelio-
rate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination
of the evil to future regulations. ... In short, the judiciary
may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom
or desirability of legislative policy determinations made
in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor pro-
ceed along suspect lines. ... In the local economic
sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the
wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment. 58
The theory adopted in Dukes is an appalling invitation
for abuse by local governments in the context of exactions.
Because the judiciary is unwilling to interfere with eco-
nomic regulations, municipalities are confident that devel-
opers will find it easier and cheaper to accept exaction
fees rather than challenge the regulations in court.
An example, anonymous because the developer's travails
continue, illustrates the potentially coercive character of
the exaction process. The developer proposed to develop
a parcel located at a boundary of a municipality. The
municipality maintains a municipal sewage system that
collects and transmits sewage to a regional wastewater
treatment facility operated by the county. Pursuant to a
sewer service agreement, the municipality collects for the
county an impact fee for the fair share of treatment facility
capacity used by each unit of development. Unfortunately
for the developer, the municipality's collection system does
not reach his property. He is therefore obligated to build
a sanitary sewer that connects to another part of the coun-
ty's system in an adjacent municipality. Worse still,
because of a downstream infiltration problem, the devel-
oper is obligated to contribute an additional $250,000 to
the repair of the downstream system. When he applied
for a building permit, he was required to pay an impact
fee that was three and a half times the amount due the
county under the sewer service agreement, even though
he had already constructed the sewer main and contributed
$250,000 to support downstream remedial efforts.
The municipality's position is simple: it does not matter
whether the fee is fair — no fee, no building permit. Given
that litigation will cost thousands of dollars and last be-
tween nine months and one year (if the municipality does
not appeal), the developer has no choice but to pay the
fee. Worst of all, to some, the municipality's position may
seem plausible because the cost levied against the developer
is in fact a pro rata share of the cost of the village's system.
This view, however, overlooks the simple fact that the
developer does not actually use the village's system and
is saddled with the fee only because his property is located
within the village.
In other words, the impotency of judicial review exagger-
ates the potential for abuse outlined above, and explains
why it is necessary to adhere strictly to the principles of fun-
damental fairness. The abuses inherent in exactions are inev-
itable and, in the face of years of experience directed to the
fairness of the planning process, unacceptable.
Regretfully, the antiplanning and due process difficulties
do not exhaust the potential problems with exactions. Im-
plicit in the concept of paying for the right to develop is
the reality that only those who can afford to pay are per-
mitted to develop — a circumstance that offers a community
a clever, but shameful, means of excluding those of an
undesirable character. In fact, in my opinion, this insidious
by-product of exactions earns it the label as the latest
sheepskin for the wolf of exclusionary zoning.
The impact of public regulation on the cost of housing
has been the subject of extensive treatment and it takes
no significant imagination to appreciate that a carefully
established exaction scheme can keep out undesirables.
Indeed, an impact fee of $5,000 to $10,000 has a significant
impact on the affordability of housing and could ensure
that only those of substantial means locate in a commu-
nity—all for the seemingly legitimate purpose of imposing
a fair share of the costs on all new development, costs
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Growth in downtown Chicago.
that are easily manipulated by elected officials through
judicious planning. Consider a community, for example,
that imposes a regulatory impact fee for a wide range of
facilities, including many desirable but unnecessary facili-
ties such as a cultural center or expansive recreation facili-
ties. The pro rata share of such facilities is $15,000, a fee
that is de minimis to the wealthy, but discriminatory
against the less fortunate, not by classification but by
effect.
One final aspect of exactions merits brief mention. The
Constitution clearly proscribes the taking of private prop-
erty for public use without payment of just compensa-
tion, 59 yet exactions amount to such a taking. Although
courts have traditionally validated exaction systems, it is
difficult to understand how a regulation that requires
dedication of land or payment of a fee in lieu thereof does
not violate the taking clause. Under an exaction scheme,
private property, land or money, is taken for public use
without just compensation. This paradox goes curiously
unresolved.
Conclusion
Exactions are a viable means of ensuring that adequate
facilities are available to serve new growth and develop-
ment. It is imperative, however, that the draftsmen and
public officials who develop such programs clearly under-
stand that there are great risks inherent in any exaction
system and that careful preparation is necessary to ensure
that the system achieves true equity.
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